Thursday, 29 September 2016

Berkeley's Human Knowing.


1.         Introduction.
Berkeley asks whether philosophy solves or creates problems. And he is of the opinion that it creates more problems than it solves. Berkley’s aim is not philosophical at all but rather the removal of philosophical obstacles to correct living. We have a few faculties and we being finite are left baffled and surprised by the infinites uncovered by our sense and reason. We tend to blame our confusion on our faculties where it is how we deploy our faculties that cause trouble. Berkley thus aims to uncover the principles that led to philosophical confusion. Our confusion is not derived from our faculties or the objects that we consider but from our using of wrong principles.[1] He tries to explain this in his ‘A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge.’
2.         Abstract ideas.
Berkeley emphasis the danger, that the mind can frame abstract ideas. Any one new to philosophy might think that logic and metaphysics are all about the study of abstract ideas, when in fact no such abstract ideas exist. The properties that something possesses cannot exist separately or in isolation. Qualities are always found mixed and blended together. However some philosophers claim that mind can consider qualities separately and isolated from others.[2] The doctrine of abstract ideas has been prone to create metaphysical confusion. Believing in the abstract ideas is perhaps the philosophical mistake, and Berkeley finds it remarkably that so much scientific and mathematical progress could have been made while their exponents remained in such philosophical confusion over fundamentals like the nature of abstraction.[3]
3.         Language.
Language is a set of artificial relations between ideas, although Berkeley expressly states that language can have other functions besides reflecting associations of ideas. Berkeley thinks that a key philosophical error is assuming that all language exists to communicate ideas, and that every meaningful symbol must stand in for a determinate idea.[4] Some of the difficulties that follow from mistakes about language might be avoided if we attended more to our ideas and less to words. Words have a bad habit of misleading, or imposing upon, our understanding. We can have benefits from throwing off philosophical error derived from language. The first benefit will be a reduced susceptibility to the doctrine of abstract ideas. Secondly, we would then have a reduced risk of getting involved in purely verbal disputes, rather than philosophical debate.[5]

4.         Human Knowing.
Berkeley defines the object of human knowing are ideas and ideas in turn can be of only three kinds: ideas imprinted on the senses, ideas acquired through attending to ‘the passions and operations of the mind’ and lastly ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination.[6] The sense of sight yields ideas of light and colour. The sense of smell yields ideas of odour. The sense of touch yields ideas of hardness and softness, etc. Thus, for example, a certain collection of colour, taste, smell, shape and texture we call ‘an apple’, while other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things.[7] Besides all the ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises diverse operations as willing, imagining, and remembering about them. This perceiving, active being is what Berkeley calls mind, spirit, soul or myself.[8] Berkeley always talks of mind or spirits but never of persons. This mind, soul or spirit is an active thing that is able to perceive ideas and operate on them. The mind is not identical with any of its ideas but is rather the thing wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived. Berkeley held that it is true that physical objects really are the things that we directly perceive and it is true that the objects of our immediate awareness really are mind-dependent entities. In Berkeley's system, real objects are those whose perceptions are more vivid, continuous and steadfast and less subject to our voluntary control, than perceptions of illusory objects. Berkeley held that physical objects are collection of sensible ideas and that sensible ideas must be directly perceptible. He denies that sensible objects can possess absolute existence, that is, their existence in a way is not related to perception but ‘out of minds of spirits or distinct from being perceived.’ Berkeley upheld the real existence of physical things but rejected utterly the absolute existence of material things.[9]
Mental objects or processes like ideas, thought or passions cannot possibly exist outside the mind.[10] It seems equally obvious that combination of ideas cannot exist outside of being perceived by some mind. We can acquire ‘an intuitive knowledge’ of this truth simply by reflecting on what the existence of sensible objects means. For example if I say a table exists I can say this if only I can see and feel it. Berkeley further states that it is impossible to form an idea of existence that is completely independent of any notion of perception[11]. For all objects that are present to the senses, existence is the same thing as being perceived. All sensible objects are simply combinations of ideas and ideas cannot exist unperceived, so no sensible object can exist unperceived.[12]
One of the greatest errors of abstraction is thinking existence can be abstracted away from perception. Light, colour, heat, etc., are merely ideas and can have no existence outside the mind. Dividing ideas from their being perceived is completely impossible.[13]
5.         Primary and Secondary qualities.
Some philosophers distinguish between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities includes extension, solidity, shape, motion, etc. and secondary qualities involve colour taste sound, etc. they say that our ideas of secondary qualities don’t resemble anything existing outside the mind but they insist that our ideas of primary qualities are patterns or images of things that exist outside the mind in an unthinking substance which they call it matter. By matter we understand that it is an inert, senseless substance in which extension shape and motion exist. But Berkeley says that extension shape and motion are clearly nothing but ideas existing in the mind and ideas can’t be like anything but other idea and that consequently neither nor things from which they are copied can exist in unperceiving substance. So the notion of matter involves a contradiction.[14]Many believe that primary qualities exist in matter and secondary qualities reside in the mind and that secondary qualities depend on the purely corporeal qualities of matter. Berkeley claims that such separability of primary and secondary qualities will not do as the primary and secondary qualities are inextricably intermingled. Berkeley says primary qualities cannot be conceived in isolation. Since ideas of colour must reside in the mind and primary and secondary qualities cannot reside in separate substances, it follows then that primary qualities can only exist in the mind.[15]
Large and small, and fast and slow (form a part of motion and extension), are generally agreed to exist only in the mind. That is because they are entirely relative: whether something is large or small, and whether it moves quickly or slowly, depends on sense-organs of the perceiver. So if there is extension outside the mind, it must be neither large nor small. This leads him to conclude that there is no such extension or motion.[16] Berkeley says number also is an inevitably mind dependent and numerical properties vary according to the acts of the mind.[17] He talks of ‘unity’ as an abstract idea.[18]

6.         Ideas.
Berkley says that all our ideas, sensation or things that we perceive are visibly inactive and they do not possess any power or agency in them. Our ideas or object of thought cannot produce or affect another. To be convinced of this we need to attend to our ideas which are wholly contained in our mind, so whatever is in them must be perceived. Attending to the properties of our ideas we will not perceive any power or activity in them so it follows that ideas are passive and torpid. An idea can’t do anything or be the cause of anything nor can it resemble anything that is active. From this it’s clear that extension, shape and motion can’t be the cause of our sensation.[19] We perceive a continual stream of ideas: with new ones arising, some changing and old ones disappearing totally. This process goes on at all times. Then something evidently should be the cause which produces these ideas, but this something just can’t be another idea, since ideas are passive and inactive. So he says that it must be therefore be some substance but he rejects material substance. He concludes by saying that the cause of ideas is an immaterial active substance which he calls ‘spirit.’[20]  A spirit is an active being. It is simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas it is called the ‘understanding’ and when thought as producing ideas or doing things with it is called ‘the will.’ Understanding and will are different powers that a spirit has; they aren’t parts of it. Hence there can be no ideas formed of a spirit, for all ideas are passive and inert, therefore they can’t represent any active thing. It is impossible to have an idea that that is like an active cause of the change of ideas. The nature of spirit is such that it cannot be perceived; all that we can do is perceive the effects it produces. To perceive a spirit would be to have an idea of it, which means to have an idea that resembles it; and this is not possible because the ideas are passive and inactive.[21] Berkeley says that one can have power over ones thoughts, however the ideas that one gets through the senses don’t depend on ones will. In the same way in broad daylight one may open his eyes, and it’s not in one’s power to choose whether to see anything or to choose particular objects to see, the same holds in hearing and the other senses. Ones will is not responsible for the ideas that come to one’s mind through any of his/her senses. So there must be some other will or spirit that produces them.[22] 
The ideas of sense are stronger, livelier, and clearer than those of the imagination; and they are also steady, orderly and coherent. Ideas that people bring into their own minds at will are often random, but the ideas of sense aren’t like that: they come in regular series, and are inter-related in admirable ways.[23] Berkeley holds that the laws of nature are thus the rules whereby the external spirit produces and regulates our ideas.[24] This stability of natural law allows us to make plans for the future and to regulate our expectations for the benefit of life, hence provide more evidence of the wisdom and benevolence of the Great Spirit that regulates the world of sensible things.[25] The ideas imprinted on the sensed by the other of nature are called ‘real things’ and those that are caused by our imagination, being less vivid, and constant, are more properly called ‘ideas’ or ‘images’ of things that they copy and represent. But our sensations, however vivid and distinct they may be, are nevertheless ideas; that is they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas that mind itself makes. The ideas of sense are agreed to have more reality in them, than ideas made by the mind; but this doesn’t show that they exist outside the mind. They are less dependent on the spirit that perceives them, for they are caused by the will of another more powerful spirit (God) but still they are ideas and certainly no idea whether faint or strong can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it.[26]
7.         Spirits.
Berkeley considers our knowledge of spirits is generally incomplete and imperfect. However, it’s not the defect in our understanding that we cannot form an idea of spirit. An idea is impossible; our failure to form an idea cannot be held against us. Perhaps, another kind of sense could yield ideas of spirit, just as we have ideas of triangles by using our sight. The doctrine that spirits could be apprehended via ideas has had unfortunate philosophical and religious consequences. Berkeley speculates that many may have been led to skepticism about the existence of the soul through trying and failing to find any idea of it. Berkley seems puzzled at why such attempts have been made, since the truth is an idea cannot resemble a spirit.[27] Berkeley says clearly that what we can know of other spirits in through what they do, that is, they arouse ideas in us. Some of the changes that we perceive among our ideas inform us that there is a certain particular agent like myself, which accompany those ideas and concur in their production in my mind. About our own ideas we know immediately but the knowledge of other spirits is not immediate, it depends on the intervention of ideas that we take to be effects or signs of agents other than myself.[28]
8.         Conclusion.
After going through this text ‘A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge’ by Berkeley. I have come to the conclusion that the thing that he tries to explain is that ideas are just passive and torpid. And our ideas can’t produce or affect others. And it’s the spirit that causes the ideas; this spirit is not material but an immaterial substance. We can’t perceive the spirit but we can only perceive the effects the spirit produces. He talks of the Great Spirit who regulates the world of sensible things, this Great Spirit is God.




[1] Talia Mae Bettcher, Berkeley: A Guide for the Perplexed, (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008) 14-15.  
[2] Alasdair Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009) 24.
[3] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 29.
[4] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 30.
[5] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 31.
[6] George Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, ed. Kenneth Winkler (Cambridge:      Hackett Publishing Company, 1995) 23.
[7] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 35.
[8] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 23.
[9] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 36- 37.
[10] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 23.
[11] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 37-38.
[12] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 39-40.
[13] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 40.
[14] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 26.
[15] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 45-46.
[16] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 27.
[17] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 47.
[18] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 28.
[19] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 32-33.
[20] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 33.
[21] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 33.
[22] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 34.
[23] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 34.
[24] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 70-71.
[25] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 71.
[26] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 35.
[27] Richmond, Berkeley's Principle of Human Knowledge, 140.
[28] Berkeley, A Treatise concerning the Principle of Human Knowledge, 81.

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